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IN THE SU~REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NED C. JENSEN, WOODROW E.
HAYWARD, RAY F. CROSHAW,
A. FOSS PETERSON and LOWELL
D. OSWALD,
Plainlif f s-A ppellants,
vs.

Case
No.10930

BOUNTIFUL CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

Appellants' Brief on Appeal
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action in the nature of quo warranto
filed by plaintiff property owners for a determination
that a purported annexation proceeding of Bountiful
City was void and invalid, and to enjoin Bountiful City
from exercising any municipal powers over the territory
of the purported annexation.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment
supported by affidavits. The matter was heard before
1

the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, District Judge of
the Second Judicial District, who granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment. The effect of the trial
court's decision was to uphold the validity of the annexation ordinance of Bountiful City.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the decision of the District Court and a determination that the annexatio11 was
Yoid and invalid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are not in dispute and are
set forth in the various affidavits filed by the parties in
support of their respective motions for summary judgment. The material facts are as follows:
On December 7, 1966, at a regular meeting of the
Bountiful City Council, an annexation petition covering
the territory described in defendant's Exhibit '' F'' was
considered by the Bountiful City Council. Following
the meeting, the petition for annexation was permitted
to be withdrawn because a majority of names of property
owners did not appear on the petition. The petition was
later recirculated, and new names obtained thereon, af tcr
which said petition was refiled on December 14, 1966
(R-42).

On December 14, the same day that the annexation
petition was filed, the Bountiful City Council, in a meet2

ing <lcsigna ted in its minutes as a "special meeting"
(R-20), acted upon the petition and passed an ordinance
annexing the involved territory (R-5, 6, 7). At the December 14 meeting, a written request was filed on the
part of 31 property owners that their names be removed
from the annexation petition (R-38-41). This request
was presented prior to the time that any action was
taken on the petition by the Bountiful City Council
(R-43).

The 1966 assessment rolls for Davis County (being
the last assessment rolls) show the names of 373 property owners in the area covered by the purported annexation. The petition as filed on December 14, 1966,
contained the names of 199 property owners whose names
appear 011 the 1966 assessment rolls. Of the 31 persons
who requested that their names be removed from the
petition, it was determined that only 26 had signed the
petition. Thus if the 26 names were permitted to be withdrawn from the petition, it would leave 173 names of
property owners on the petition, or less than a majority
as shown by the last assessment rolls (R-36).
After the annexation ordinance had been passed,
Bountiful City caused to have a title search made covering the record ownership of the involved territory as of
Deremher 14, 1966. In doing so, the title searcher commenced with the 1966 assessment rolls; then added the
iiames of all persons acquiring property in the area but
whose names did not yet appear on the assessment rolls;
i hen su htrncted the names of persons whose names appear 011 the assessment rolls but who divested them3

selves of title as of Decmber 14, 1966. After going
through this process, it was determined that there were
431 owners of record of whom 243 signed the annexation petition (R-11). Using this formula, if the 26 withdrawing names are permitted, it leaves Bountiful City
with 1.5 names over a majority.
Following the passage of the annexation ordinance,
an additional petition was signed and filed in this action
by some 44 additional property owners who had signed
the original petition for annexation stating that they
had been misinformed as to the facts concerning the
advantages and disadvantages of annexation, that they
desired their names to be removed from the annexation
petition, that had they been given an opportunity to
sign the withdrawal petition filed with the Bountiful
City Council on December 14, 1966, they would have
done so, and that they are opposed to the annexation
(R-44-50).
Additional facts which would invalidate the annexation are as follows: The annexation petitions as
they were being circulated contained no plat, map or
description of the property proposed to be annexed
(R-42), although said petitions referred to an attached
plat (R-27). Further, the circulators of the petition
misrepresented the area to be included, and descriptions
of the property given by the circulators to local newspapers and published during the time of circulation were
different from the property actually included in the
annexation ordinance ( R-43).
4

Plaintiffs in this action are all property owners in
the area covered by the annexation. Before commencing
the action, they complied with Rule 65 B (d) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, in that they requested the Attorney
General of the State of Utah to bring and maintain this
action, and the Attorney General has failed and refused
to do so (R-43).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFFS AS PROPERTY OWNERS
HAVE STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS
ACTION.
·while the authorities are divided, plaintiffs recognize that there is a line of authority holding that once
an annexation ordinance is passed, the State alone may
question the validity of the ordinance, the remedy being
that of quo warranto. Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations,
~65; 13 A.L.R.2d 1279; 18 A.L.R.2d 1255.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, special
forms or writ have been abolished, however, the old
form of quo warranto is now covered by Rule 65 B (b)
1. Whereas prior to the time of the adoption of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procdure the remedy of quo warranto rested solely with the State, Rule 65 B ( c) now
provides that the action may be brought by the Attorney
General, and Rule 65 B ( d) provides that a private person may bring an action in his own name if the Attorney
Gem•ral fails to do so after notice. Thus in Utah the

remedy of quo warranto, formerly available only to the
State, is by statute given to an individual if the Attorney
General fails to act. The affidavits filed in the cas~
clearly show that plaintiffs have complied with the requirement of giving notice to the Attorney General and
his refusal to act, and said facts remain undispnted.
The case of State vs. Ryan, 41 Utah 327, 125 Pac.
666, decided prior to the adoption of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, held that an individual property owner
could not maintain an action in quo warranto to test the
validity of an entity kno\vn as the "Wasatch High School
District.'' This case was controlled by a then existing
statute compelling the Attorney General to bring and
maintain actions in quo warranto. The court held in the
absence of a statute permitting an individual to bring
an action that his remedy would be to file an action
against the Attorney General, and if good cause were
shown, the court would compel the Attorney General to
bring an action of quo warranto on the relation of such
individual. The case recognizes that an individual could
maintain an action in his own name if a statute gave him
said right, and the purpose of Rule 65 B (d) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, was to provide said right and to
permit a private individual to commence an action where
the Attorney General fails to do so after notice (See
Compiler's notes, Rule 65B (d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
Although not involving similar issues, this court in
the case of Sjostrom vs. Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373, 393 P.2d
6

472, entertained an action in the nature of quo warranto.
The action was filed by an individual and his capacity was
not questioned either by the defendants or by the Utah
Supreme Court.
The above would seem to answer any question regarding plaintiffs' capacity to maintain this action, even
assuming that the least favorable authorities were applicable in Utah. It is to be noted, however, that another
line of authorities as ref erred to in the annotations cited
herein, recognize the right of an individual to maintain
an action in any event, and particularly in cases where
it is shown that the annexation proceedings are void.
It is stated in 13 A.L.R.2d 1292 as follows:
"In what appears to be a recognized exception
to the general rule that a private individual is
without capacity to attack the alteration of
municipal limits or bounds, the view has been
taken that where the act of alteration is absolutely
void, because not authorized by law nor under
color of law, it is subject to attack by anyone,
whenever and wherever its validity is questioned
(Numerous authorities cited)".

It appears from all of the above that regardless of
what rule is adopted in Utah, the plaintiffs have full
standing to maintain this action. The position of the
respondent that if the plaintiffs have been wronged they
have no remedy is completely untenable.
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POINT II.
THE STATUTORY TEST FOR DETERMINING WHO IS ELIGIBLE TO SIGN AN ANNEXATION PETITION IS DETERMINED BY
THE LAST ASSESSMENT ROLLS.
Section 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 sets forth
the procedure for annexation and provides as follows:

"Whenever a majority of the owners of real property and the owners of not less than one-third in
value of the real property, as shown by the last
assessment rolls, in territory lying contiguous to
the corporate limits of any city or town shall desire to annex such city or town, they shall cause
an accurate plat or map of such territory to be
made under the supervision of the city engineer or
of a competent surveyor, and a copy of said plat
or map, certified by said engineer or surveyor as
the case may be, shall be filed in the office of the
recorder or town clerk of the city or town, together with a petition in writing, signed by a
majority of the real property owners a1nd by the
owners of not less than one-third in value of the
real property, as shown by the last assessment
rolls, of the territory described in said plat; and
the board of citv commissioners or the city council, or board of trustees, at the next regular meeting thereof shall vote upon the question of such
annexation. If two-thirds of all the members of
the board of city commissioners or the city council
or board of trustees, vote for such annexation, an
ordinance shall be passed, declaring the annexation of such territory and the extension of the
limits of such city or town accordingly. A copy of
the map or plat duly certified shall at once be fil.ed
in the office of the county recorder, together with
a certified copy of the ordinance declar~ng such
annexation, and thereupon such annexation sha11
8

be deemed complete, and the said territory shall
be deemed and held to be a part of said city or
town, and the inhabitants thereof shall thereafter
enjoy the privileges of such annexation and be
subject to the ordinances and regulations of said
city or town." (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the placement of the commas in the
above statute that the phrase "as shown by the
last assessment rolls" applies to both the majority of
o\vners and the one-third valuation requirement. Otherwise, the punctuation would have been "Whenever a
majority of the owners of real property, and the owners
of not less than one-third in value of the real property
as shown by the last assessment rolls.'' Thus, a petition must be signed by a "majority of the owners ... as
shown by the last assessment rolls."
While it is true that punctuation marks are not conclusive in the interpretation of a statute and that a court
will disregard the same if there is an obvious error in
punctuation, nevertheless it is presumed that the legislature in phrasing a statute knows the ordinary rules of
grammar and that the grammatical reading of a statute
gives it correct sense; accordingly an interpretation is
to be avoided which is contrary to the grammatical construction of the statute. Am. Jur. Statutes, §252. The
fact that the same punctuation is used in two places in
the statute would seem to discount the possibility of a
fogislative error in punctuation.
Further, as a matter of policy, it would seem that
the assessment roll test has great merit and would consti-

tute the most practical and better rule. Reference to the
assessment rolls sets up an objective and easily determined formula by which the city authorities, the circulators of the petition, those objecting thereto, and any other
interested parties, can quickly determine how many signatures are required and upon which they can rely. Plaintiffs in this case did in fact rely upon the assessment
rolls and did not have time, nor did they deem it necessary, to make a complete search of the county records in
determining the number of signatures necessary for the
withdrawing petition. After the annexation ordinance
was passed another petition was signed by some 44 additional property owners showing that they would have
signed the withdrawing petition had they been given an
opportunity to do so, and that they are opposed to the
annexation.

It would create a very cumbersome procedure to
adopt the rule suggested by defendant which requires (1)
reference to the assessment rolls, (2) a search of all county records covering all of the property in the proposed
area to be annexed, (3) computation of additional names
of new purchasers from the time of the last assessment
rolls, and ( 4) subtraction of those who have sold property
from the time of the last assessment rolls.
Defendant argued to the trial court that the assessment roll test might under certain conditions produce an
unreasonable result and suggested a hypothetical fact
situation where a subdivider could subdivide his property
in the early part of the year, sell all the lots, and not
permit the new owners to have any voice in an annexa10

tion if a petition were filed before the end of the year.
While it is true that ownership may change during the
year and between the preparation of the annual assessment rolls, it is also true that there are often drastic
changes in valuation. Defendant might just as well argue
that if a property owner were to build a skyscraper and
thus i11crease his valuation to the point of being 90% of
all surrounding properties, that his neighbors ought not
to be permitted to file an annexation petition based upon
the valuation as determined by the last assessment rolls.
The equitable argument of defendant when applied to
hoth hypothetical fact situations may be equally the
same, however, defendant apparently would urge the
court to make inconsistent interpretations of the annexation statute. It is not uncommon in our society for an individual to temporarily lose his voting franchise for a
short period when he changes his residence. Sometimes
the privilege of voting must be sacrificed in favor of providing a workable and practical method of procedure to
carry out the functions and processes of government. It
would appear that this is what the legislature did in the
instant case.
A further protection against the result of defendant's hypothetical is the statute permitting disconnection
hy petition to the District Court of a majoriy of real
property owners where justice and equity require disannexa tion (See 10-4-1, 2 Utah Code Annotated 1953).
Respondent also argued to the trial court that prior
to 1957, ~10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, the annexation statute, did not contain a valuation requirement and
11

that reference to the assessment rolls was first inserted
into the statute in the 1957 amendment requiring those
petitioning for annexation to meet the one-third va1uation requirement; it was argued from this premise that
the reference to assessment rolls only applies to valuation and not ownership. This argument is without merit.
In amending the statute, it would be completely unreasonable to assume that the legislature ever intended to set
a different time for determining ownership from that
of determining value. It would seem that any presumption in statutory interpretation should he in favor of
consistency rather than inconsistency on the part of the
legislature.
The legislature could have set up any number of tests
for determining eligibility to sign an annexation petition. Such test might have been a majority of taxpayers. It might have been a majority of registered voters.
It might have been a majority of residents in the area.
Or it might have been a majority of record title owners
on the date of the ordinance as defendant is attemptin~
to assert in this case. The fact remains, however, that
the legislature did not adopt any of these tests, but provided that the annexation petition must be signed by a
majority of property owners ''as shown by the 1ast
assessment rolls." At C. J. S. Municipal Corporations,
~44, it is stated as follows:

"In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the
legislature has discretionary power to det:rmine
the conditions or circumstances under which annexation of territory to a municipa1 corporation
mav be had and where it prescribes conditions,
.
'
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those conditions must be met before territory can
be annexed.''
In the instant case, the legislature in the exercise of its
discretionary power, set forth the conditions which must
be met for an annexation. The conditions as prescribed
by statute must be met, and defendant cannot change
the conditions or prescribe a different test or rule.

In the recent case of Thompson v. City of Centerrille, 18 Utah 2d 174, 417 Pac. 670, the Utah Supreme
Court in determining who was eligible to vote in a local
bond election was called upon to determine the constitutional definition of ''such qualified electors as shall have
paid a property tax." In answering this question, the
court stated as follows:
'' ... so far as this act is concerned, means and
since statehood has meant, those who have appeared as legal owners of real property, as is reflected on the official assessment and tax rolls, no
matter who paid the taxes."
The court went on to hold that a wife, conditional sales
vendee, mortgagee, mechanics lien claimant, heir or others who claim an equitable or inchoate interest in property were not eligible to vote in the election. While it
could have been argued that a conditional sales vendee,
for example, is a beneficial owner of property in the
broad semie, the court's definition was in accordance with
the language used in the Constitution.
Thus in the instant case, an owner ''as shown by
the last assessment rolls'' must be defined and limited
in accordance with the statutory language used.
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POINT III
A SIGNER OF AN ANNEXATION PETITION
HAS THE RIGHT TO REMOVE HIS NAME
AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE TIME THE
PETITION IS ACTED UPON.
At 27 A.L.R. 2d 604 and 126 A.L.R. 1031 are extensive annotations relating to the right of a signer of a
petition to \vithdraw his name from the petition. The
authorities are in agreement that signers may withdraw
their names at any time before filing; the authorities arc
also in agreement that signers may not withdraw names
after an ordinance goes into effect. As to the time after
a petition is filed and before it is acted upon, the authorities are in disagreement. Some say that a signature cannot be withdrawn after filing, however, the majority
rule is to the effect that a person may withdraw his name
from a petition after filing, without any reason whatsoever, any time before the petition is acted upon. Utah
is among those jurisdictions adopting the majority rule,
the leading case being Hal gr en v. Welling, 91 Utah 16,
63 P.2d 550. This case involved an initiative petition
rather than an annexation petition, but the same principle is involved. The court in its opinion stated as
follows:
"In some cases the matter of protest of withdrawal is a matter of statutory regulation. There is no
provision in the initiative ancl referendum law of
the state of Utah relating to the withdrawal of
names from a petition after it has been once
signed. There is no substantial reason why a person who has once signed a petition may not, at
any time before the petition has been actecl upon,
14

withdraw his name, and if timely done, his name
should not be counted. There is a division in the
authorities as to whether the withdrawal must be
made before the petition is filed or before it has
been acted upon. The weight of authority is that
the withdrawal may be made at any time before
the petition has been acted upon.''
The cases give many reasons for the adoption of the
majority rule. Courts recognize that signers of petitions sometimes do so hastily or unthinkingly and without consideration of the results. A person's second
thoughts are apt to be more deliberate and as a result
of considering both sides of the issue, and would normally
represent a person's best judgment.
No contractual relation is involved. There is no
consideration given for any signatures and a petition
contains no promise. One signature is not a consideration for another.
Analogy has been made to a civil action. After
filing, a plaintiff in a civil action may withdraw or dismiss a complaint as a matter of right unless affirmative
relief is sought. Courts recognize that one cannot attach more importance to a petition than to a summons
and complaint in a civil action.
Cases restricting the right of withdrawal generally
deal with statutory procedures where there has been
reasonable opportunity to withdraw.
Applying the Utah rule and the rule adopted by a
majority of courts to the instant case, if the 26 names
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were removed from the annexation petition pursuant to
the request of the property owners made prior to the
time the petition was acted upon by the Bountiful Cih
Council, the petition would not have contained a majorit~·
of owners as shown hy the last assessment rolls and the
annexation ordinance is thus invalid.
POINT IV.
THE ANNEXATION ORDINANCE WAS NOT
ACTED UPON AT A "REGULAR MEETING"
AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE, AND IS
THEREFORE INVALID.
Section 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated states that
when an annexation petition is filed, it must be acted
upon at the ''next regular meeting.''
Excerpts from the minutes of the meetings of Bountiful City Council held on December 7 and December 14,
1966, show that even the city itself referred to the December 14 meeting as a "special meeting" as opposed to
a regular meeting (R-18, 20). It was admitted that this
meeting was not held at the time Bountiful City normally and regularly schedules its City Council meetings
(R-12).

The annexation ordinance \YaS passed on the very
day the petition was filed and at a special meeting. The
people were not given an opportunity to fu11y consider
the matter, and many more would have signed the witlidrawing petition, as indicated by their affidavits, 1rnrl
there been tim<> an opportnnit~- to do so. It is snhmitte<l
16

that perhaps the very reason why the legislature required that action be taken at the next regular meeting
and not at a pre-scheduled special meeting was to avoid
the results of what happened in this case.
It has been held that statutory requirements in effecting annexation must be complied with strictly, particularl~, where a statute permits a city governing body
to annex territory in direct opposition to the wishes 0f
tl1ose whose interests are to be affected. Rhyne, Munici/Jal Law, Section 2-34.

POINT V
THE ANNEXATION PETITIONS DID NOT
CONTAIN A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY WHEN THEY WERE CIRCULATED,
AND THUS CANNOT SUPPORT A VALID
ORDINANCE.
The annexation petitions described the property by
a plat, referring to "a copy of which plat is attached
hereto and made a part of this petition," and also refer
to "the attached map." The uncontroverted facts show
that such a map was in fact not attached to the petitions
and that signers were misled as to the areas to be includt>cl in the annexation. Thus the petition by its very terms
was not complete when signed and circulated.
It would seem under the rule previously ref erred to
under Point IV requiring a strict adherence to statutory requirements in annexation proceedings, that this
defect would be fatal. Particularly should this rule be
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applied where the defendants will be subjected to iucreased property taxation of Bountiful City, as is the
case here.

POINT VI.
AN ANNEXATION ORDINANCE IS NOT AN
E:!\fERGENCY ORDINANCE.
The annexation ordinance of Bountiful City proYicled by its terms that it was a measure "necessary for the
immediate preserYation of the peace, health and safety
of the city" and thus was to take effect immediate!~·
(R-7) rather tlian in the normal fashion as proYicled by
Section 10-6-12 Utah Code Annotated 1953. It is <lifficua
to conceive how under any stretch of the imagination an
annexation ordinance would he necessary for the peace,
health and safety of the city. This is but another indication of the ·way in which the ordinance was quickly railroaded through, contrary to the wishes of the peopl0.
Whether or not an emergency exists would only
make a difference if the court should rule against plaintiffs in that the effective date of the ordinance \\'Ould bt'
'
extended beyond January 1, 1967, and the residents in
the area would not be subjected to city property taxes
for the year 1967.
This point is moot if the court rnlPs with plaintiff~
on the main issnes, which plaintiffs respectfully urge the
court to clo.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the foregoing authorities, plaintiffs respectfully submit that the decision of the trial
court in this action be reversed.

THOMAS, ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER
By David E. West
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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